Economic history : The lessons of Jamestown by Stephen Slivinski
W
hen British royalty and
men of commerce looked
westward to the New
World in the late 16th century they
saw the benefit that a permanent
colony could provide. Yet they had
different notions of why such a 
settlement could prove worthwhile. 
Queen Elizabeth, and her adviser
Sir Walter Raleigh, had an interest in
establishing a colony in North
America for the sake of keeping
Spanish outposts there in check. In
1587, Raleigh attempted to settle a
colony on Roanoke Island in the
Outer Banks area of present-day
North Carolina. The ongoing sea war
with the Spanish empire, however,
tied up the ships that would have
replenished the colony. It would be
three years before a resupply voyage
was made to Roanoke. Upon arrival,
the captain of the resupply vessel dis-
covered that the settlement was
deserted. Historians today still debate
what caused the colony’s demise.
The next effort at starting a perma-
nent colony in North America had 
its roots in 1606, under the reign of
James I. This time the colony was not
seen as a launching-off point to con-
quer and plunder the outposts of
England’s rivals. That was strictly for-
bidden by the new king, in fact, as he
had recently made peace with Spain. 
Instead, it would be an endeavor
that was privately funded and moti-
vated mainly by commerce. As histori-
an Edmund Morgan described it, the
investors had “hopes of finding 
precious metals or minerals, of discov-
ering valuable plants for dyestuffs and
medicines, and perhaps of opening a
northwest passage to the Pacific. But
they were prepared to settle for  glass,
iron, furs, potash, pitch, and tar, things
that England needed and mostly had
to import from other countries.” 
They knew generating a profit
would take time and were taking a long
view of the investment. After all, 
this new settlement wasn’t meant to
resemble the trading posts that
England had established in other
countries where English goods were
unloaded in exchange for native prod-
ucts. Instead, the settlers would have
to produce original articles of trade
that could not or would not be pro-
duced at home. 
Thus, the Virginia Company of
London came into existence in 1606,
composed of a group of investors led
by well-known merchant, Sir Thomas
Smythe. The company was granted a
charter by the king that awarded them
the right to establish a colony of 
100 miles square somewhere approxi-
mately between Cape Fear and Long
Island Sound. 
In December 1606, three ships —
the Susan Constant, the Godspeed, and
the Discovery — left England carrying
the first settlers, just over 100
mariners and adventurers in all, to the
shores of Virginia. When the
captains of those vessels
looked for a proper place to
drop anchor, they used a for-
mula devised by Richard
Hakluyt, a writer and geogra-
pher who was an adviser to
King James and an investor in
the Virginia Company. It was
a simple recipe: Find a place
near the entrance of a naviga-
ble river that could be easily
defended. 
They found a preferred
spot on May 14, 1607, along
what is called the James River
today, about 60 miles from
the opening at the Chesapeake Bay,
placing it at a great enough distance to
give the settlers ample warning of any
invasion by sea. The settlement was
also situated on a peninsula that made
















































The Lessons of Jamestown
BY STEPHEN SLIVINSKI
ECONOMICHISTORY
Archaeological excavations of the
Jamestown colony have identified a
severe drought as a problem that beset this
early British settlement. Economists and
historians point to the collective 




of the earliest 
British colonies
Region Focus | First Quarter | 2010  27navigable for another 75 miles into the interior of Virginia —
as far as present-day Richmond.
Jamestown seemed as if it was off to a good start. The
land was hospitable to farming, and two of the colony’s 
leaders, John Smith and Christopher Newport, were rela-
tively successful at opening initially cordial relations with
the nearby Powhatan Indian tribe. By the end of June,
Newport was able to return to England with some of the
exports the colonists had already created.
Yet, by Newport’s return in January 1608, nearly two-
thirds of the settlers were dead. For the entire official life of
the colony, an average of one out of every four settlers would
survive. Part of the hardship was beyond the direct control
of the colonists. But another element — the labor and land
polices of the colony — exacerbated the difficulties the 
settlement faced during the first 10 years of its existence.     
In 1624, the Virginia Company would lose its charter.
Historians are often quick to refer to Jamestown as a failed
settlement: Until the rapid revenue growth generated by
tobacco farming that started around 1613, the colony didn’t
turn a profit. Yet, the years before then were an important
learning experience for the residents of Jamestown. 
AGrim Beginning
Although it was not meant to be primarily an agricultural
endeavor, the Jamestown settlers anticipated the need to
establish a strong agricultural output. But that would take
time. So they initially based their sustenance on the trade
that would result from maintaining a good relationship with
the Indian tribes in the area. While they did trade for food
with the nearby Powhatan tribe, it was a sporadic and unre-
liable arrangement as the relations with the Indians were
often tense and occasionally broke down. 
In any case, the trading activity would not likely have
yielded enough to sustain the settlers for a long period of
time. Instead, they tended to rely on supplies sent from
England. It could not be assured that the supply ships would
always arrive on schedule, however, especially since the 
vessels sometimes encountered harsh weather. (In 1609, for
instance, one of the supply ships was temporarily ship-
wrecked in Bermuda. The incident became the inspiration
for William Shakespeare’s play The Tempest.)     
Malnutrition was one of the biggest drivers of the high
mortality rate in those early years. Weather patterns had a
profound effect on the rate of malnutrition. An analysis of
800-year old bald cypress trees at the colony site conducted
in 1997 indicated that lack of sufficient rainfall in the period
of 1606 to 1612 produced a severe drought that has not been
matched since. Historians and scientists note that not only
did this put a large strain on the Jamestown crops but it also
made the food harvested by the Powhatan more valuable to
the tribe itself and most of it was not traded to the settlers.   
Additionally, the colony didn’t have a freshwater well
until 1609. This forced them to rely on water from the James
River. That water was much too salty and consumption of it
surely contributed to the deteriorating health of the
colonists. The lack of rainfall during the drought only exac-
erbated this problem.
Beginning three months after the landing at Jamestown,
historian Philip Bruce explains that until the fall “hardly a
day was unmarked by death.” New York University historian
Karen Kupperman notes that virtually every letter written
during this period by colonists from Virginia speaks of “the
helplessness the colonists felt before the phenomenon of
widespread deaths.” Of the 104 people who had left London
in 1607, all but 38 were dead within six months of arriving in
Jamestown.
The winter of 1609 was particularly hard. Although the
Virginia Company had sent 500 new recruits to the colony
that summer, the population was reduced to about 60 only
six months later. The period is known in the histories of the
colony and first-hand accounts as the “starving time.” 
The Problem of Adverse Incentives
The drought and harsh winters, while dealing a massive blow
to the settlers’ ability to sustain themselves, were not 
the only contributors to the colonies’ low agricultural pro-
ductivity. The legal status of workers and property — and the
adverse incentives this created for the colony’s workers —
played a role in the colony’s failures through 1619.
University of Chicago economist David Galenson
explains that the Virginia Company treated workers “as
bound servants of the company for lengthy terms.” This
indentured servitude worked in a very specific way. The
laborers would sign a contract that pledged them to work for
the recruiting agent — in this case, the Virginia Company —
for a specified period. The company then paid for the 
servants’ transportation to Jamestown, housed them in bar-
racks, provided them with rations and clothes, and put them
to work.
The incentive this created for the workers seems obvious,
at least in retrospect. Once arriving at the colony, there 
wasn’t necessarily a reason that the servants wouldn’t be 
better off trying to escape. The company realized this and
instituted martial restraints on the servants. That did not,
however, stem the frequent escape of a servant to the coun-
tryside to start his own settlement or even to live within the
protection of the nearby Indian tribes. 
Additionally, even those who remained under contract
saw little reason to be productive. The contracts were set for
a period of seven years and the terms were rigid. A servant
was unlikely to be able to terminate his contract early if he
worked hard. As Morgan describes it, “The work a man did
bore no direct relation to his reward. The laggard would
receive as large a share in the end as the man who worked
hard.” Thus, the general tendency of the servants was to
work less or less efficiently.
By 1611, the company thought simply providing more
manpower might solve many of the problems the colony 
was facing. (The colony, for instance, was still relying on 
corn obtained from the Powhatans, something the investors
thought would not bode well for the long-term prospects 
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 of the colony.) The company sent Sir Thomas Dale, a 
British naval commander, to take over the office of colony
governor in 1611. 
Yet, upon arrival in May — a time when the farmers
should have been tending to their fields — Dale found virtu-
ally no planting activity. Instead, the workers were devoted
mainly to leisure and “playing bowls.” “[T]he settlers did 
not have even a modified interest in the soil, or a partial
ownership in the returns of their labor,” explains historian
Philip Bruce.
Another fundamental problem built into the Virginia
Company’s original plan for the colony was its treatment of
property. All land was owned by the company and farmed
collectively. The lack of private property in that case encour-
ages people to use up a resource faster because nobody has
an incentive to preserve it for future use. Instead, the collec-
tive property of the Jamestown colony reinforced the
adverse incentive structure of the indentured labor arrange-
ment: The workers would not hope to reap more
compensation from a productive farming of the land any
more than the farmers would be motivated by an interest in
making their farming operations more efficient and, hence,
more profitable.
Seeing this, Dale decided to change the labor arrange-
ments: When the seven-year contracts of most of the
original surviving settlers were about to expire in 1614, he
assigned private allotments of land to them. Each got three
acres, 12 acres if he had a family. The only obligation was 
that they needed to provide two and a half barrels of corn 
annually to the company so it could be distributed to the
newcomers to tide them over during their first year.  
Dale left Jamestown for good in 1616. By then, however,
the new land grants had unleashed a vast increase in agricul-
tural productivity. In fact, upon returning to England with
Dale, John Rolfe — one of the colony’s former leaders —
reported to the Virginia Company that the Powhatans were
now asking the colonists to give them corn instead of vice
versa. A letter written from one stockholder to another at
the time noted that “the worst of that colony is past”
because the colonists “were well victualed by their own
industry.” 
The reform was so successful that the company decided
to further expand the land grants in 1618. Those who had
arrived before 1616, referred to as “Old Planters,” were
awarded 100 acres apiece whenever their terms of service
were up. (If a colonist had paid his own way to the colony, he
would immediately receive his 100 acres.) Shareholders in
the company also received 100 acres for every share they
owned. Settlers who arrived after 1616 got 50 acres. The
reform was also used as an enticement to attract settlers to
the colony: Anyone who came on his own thereafter would
receive the “headright” of 50 acres, as would anyone who had
paid for the transportation of a new settler.
The labor arrangements were also modified to attract
more workers, particularly impoverished English laborers
who could be persuaded to take a chance in the New World:
Anyone sent to the colony at company expense would be
assigned some land to work then as sharecropping tenants
and turn over half of his earnings to the company for seven
years. At the end of those seven years, the laborer would also
receive 50 acres of his own. 
Colonial Parallels
The experience of Jamestown seemed to have a parallel in
the Plymouth colony farther north. That settlement was
founded in 1620 and financed by the Plymouth Company, a
joint stock company that was granted an identical charter 
by James I as was granted to the Virginia Company for the 
mid-Atlantic zone. 
It soon became obvious that the Cape Cod colony could
hardly feed itself. The governor, William Bradford, diag-
nosed the problem as a lack of incentive to produce
efficiently resulting from the common property restriction.
“For this community (as far as it was),” he wrote in his 
memoirs, “was found to breed much confusion and discon-
tent and retard much employment that would have been to
their benefit and comfort. For the young men, that were
most fit and able for labour and service, did repine that they
should spend their time and strength to work for other
men’s wives and children without any recompense.” Private
property was allowed in the Massachusetts Bay colony in
1623, only three years after the settlers landed on shore. 
In Jamestown, tragedy struck in 1622 when an attack by a
Powhatan tribe destroyed the settlement and killed many of
the colonists. For the next two years, the company officials
and the British government were at odds over whether the
colony could survive as a commercial endeavor. In 1624,
King James decided to revoke its charter to the Jamestown
settlement, after which it came under direct control of the
crown. But it is in Jamestown that the general presumption
of private land ownership as being a key to prosperity in the
New World had its earliest roots.  RF
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